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Henrique Capriles, the Venezuelan opposition leader running for president against Hugo Chávez,
said on Aug. 1 that he would scrap preferential oil deals with foreign allies including Argentina,
Cuba and others, Reuters reported. Capriles said the country would save $6.7 billion annually
under his plan, money that he would use for domestic social spending. Meanwhile, state-run oil
company PDVSA reportedly will need to set aside between $4 billion and $7 billion annually for
the next five years to make payments on its heavy debt burden, analysts have forecast. Has
Venezuela’s petro-diplomacy run the end of its course? Which countries would suffer the most
from an end to PetroCaribe and Venezuela’s other preferential oil deals? If re-elected, will
Chávez be able to maintain the agreements? How serious of a problem has PDVSA's debt burden
become?
A: Carlos Bellorin, senior petroleum analyst at IHS in London:
"Venezuela's 'petro-diplomacy' hasn't run its course, but under a hypothetical Capriles
administration, it will certainly be reduced to the necessary minimum and won't have the same
relevance it had for the incumbent administration. Although, Capriles' approach suggests a
strong focus on domestic affairs, Venezuela will still be a player in the region and the country
will need international allies in order to secure a smooth transition and international recognition.
I think Capriles and his petroleum policy advisors are smart enough to play this card wisely,
placing internal rather than external affairs at the top of the agenda without isolating the country.
However, Capriles has stressed that resources being used in 'petro-diplomacy' will be destined to
tackle internal needs. The closest allies will suffer the most. Cuba and Nicaragua are the most
exposed; they receive significant amounts of oil under very attractive conditions, thus helping
their weak economies. All 'energy cooperation agreements' (especially the one with Cuba) will
be either broadly renegotiated or terminated. A total withdrawal of PetroCaribe won't be the right
policy decision but a renegotiation of its conditions needs to be on the agenda. If Chávez is reelected, I think he will be able to maintain the agreements since his administration gives a lot of
weight to geopolitics and assuming a leadership role in the region. However, it is not and won't
be sustainable to maintain all of them. PDVSA's debt burden is a serious issue because is
increasing very fast. However, at this point, although the debt burden is significant, it is still
manageable for a company the size of PDVSA under the current oil prices. The problem resides
with channelling the majority of the debt generated to financing massive social spending instead
of being used for oil industry investments. PDVSA's poor record of increasing production under

this administration is well-known. Part of this problem comes from the lack of funding combined
by sub-standard managerial capabilities, corruption and an erroneous operational lay-out. "
A: Dan Hellinger, professor of political science at Webster University in St. Louis:
"Capriles' figures are disingenuous. Most of the 'free' oil is sold to selected countries (and some
poor communities in the United States) at discounted financing that kicks in when the price
exceeds $40/barrel. In many cases, this involves barter arrangements, and both Chávez and
Capriles can be creative in calculating the monetary value of discounts. In addition to
approximately 70,000 barrels sold to Cuba under similar terms, about 98,000 barrels are sold at
$27, mostly in exchange for services, which include thousands of Cuban medical personnel
working in Barrio Adentro, the health care program. If elected, Capriles must choose between
keeping his promise to maintain this program or ending the Cuban deal. Pedro Pérez, runner-up
to Capriles in the opposition primary, said during his campaign that he would revise, not end the
Cuban agreement. Capriles would face immense pressure on his right, but renegotiation would
not surprise me. Cuba is clearly moving toward a mixed economy, and Venezuela might want a
presence. Though he seemed to promise to end all oil discounts, Capriles did not explicitly
promise to terminate agreements with Caricom nations. Oil discounts aimed at increasing
Venezuelan influence in the Caribbean and Central America are not new; Carlos Andrés Pérez
took a similar initiative during his first presidency, during the 1970s oil boom. Capriles surely
would renegotiate and in some cases end oil discount programs, but his promise 'not to export
one drop of free oil' is a populist ploy unlikely to be fully implemented, should he become
president."
A: Risa Grais-Targow, Latin America associate at the Eurasia Group::
"Between heavy domestic subsidies, oil-for-loan deals with China and petro-diplomacy programs
like PetroCaribe,Venezuela is currently giving away around one third of its oil production at
below-market prices. Among these programs, PetroCaribe and other foreign aid would be the
least politically costly to cut. In the likely event that Chávez is re-elected, he will likely maintain
these agreements. If, however, Chávez's health forces him to step aside and appoint a successor
or the opposition manages to eke out a win, PetroCaribe's future would be in question. Whether
PetroCaribe outlives Chávez will depend on his successor, but given that the program has been
driven mostly by Chávez's own foreign policy preferences, the growing problems facing
Venezuela's economy and the lackluster performance of state oil company PDVSA reduce the
incentives for a future PSUV government to maintain the program. Should Capriles win, he has
already indicated that he would axe the program. The dismantling of PetroCaribe and other
Venezuelan aid programs would significantly affect a number of recipient countries that depend
on concessional financing and have avoided making politically unpalatable economic
adjustments, with Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and especially Cuba being the hardest hit.
Venezuelan aid has helped enable the Castro regime gradually implement economic reforms
while keeping a tight lid on any political opening. Without financing from Venezuela however,
the Castro regime would likely be forced to speed up the pace of liberalization, which in turn
could make it more challenging to contain demands for political reforms as well."

A: Asdrúbal Oliveros, director of Ecoanalítica in Caracas:
"The first thing to analyze is the credibility of PDVSA's oil production goals. In the company's
2006 report, it set a goal of producing 5.8 million barrels a day (mb/d) of crude oil and liquid
natural gas by 2012. Well, 2012 is here, and the most recent official oil production figures (from
2011) put oil production at 3.1 mb/d. This falls short of the goal by 2.7 mb/d, and there is no way
that the company can increase oil production by this amount in what's left of the year. As long as
PDVSA has to continue dabbling in the activities of other sectors, thereby neglecting its oil
industry operations, its ambitious oil production goals will become less and less realistic. The
only way PDVSA will even get close to meeting these oil production levels, and be able to
regain any sort of credibility among oil industry players, is to totally focus all its energies on oil
industry operations, eliminating all other distractions. Another point that has to be analyzed is
PDVSA's financing capacity. Does the company have enough resources available to cover the
investments it says it is planning? Looking at PDVSA's financial balances between 2006 and
2011, we have calculated incoming revenue and subtracted costs and spending (not including
investment) and transfers made to the executive office (formal as well as social contributions).
The resulting figure is the amount of resources available to the company to cover its investment
projects. PDVSA had available resources enough to finance up to 74 percent (on average) of its
investment plans; these resources coming from its main activity, the oil industry. This leaves 26
percent that the company was unable to cover by itself. This forces PDVSA to look to the foreign
capital markets for financing, or as a last option, associate itself with private capital and creating
a mixed company."
The Energy Advisor welcomes responses to this Q&A. Readers can write editor Gene Kuleta at
gkuleta@thedialogue.org with comments.

